Случайно в процессе поисков нужного мне натолкнулся на ряд интересных материалов в первом номере 71-го тома журнала Infantry за январь-февраль 1981-го года:
Кроме разбора системы MIWS – Multipurpose Individual Weapons System - это такой предок неудачных CAWS и т.д. и т.п. в журнале меня заинтересовала американская статья-передовица вполне в духе The Rise, Fall, & Rebirth Of The 'Emma Gees'
MACHINEGUN USE - A LOST ART by MAJOR GENERAL DAVID E. GRANGE J.R:
During the past 15 years, the attention we infantrymen once gave to training with and employing our machineguns has shifted dramatically to training with and employing our antitank guided missile (ATGM) weapon systems. The awesome numbers and combat potential of the Threat armored vehicles dictated this shift.
Unfortunately, when we did shift our attention so dramatically from our machineguns, we also began to ignore the problems associated with the close-in infantry battle and to overlook the important role our machineguns will play in our future combined arms battles. Let no one think otherwise: Our machineguns will have an important role to play in our future combat operations, especially if we must fight in built-up areas, mountainous areas, and forests, and no one can doubt their value when we are called on to conduct patrols and raids against enemy forces or installations.
Our machineguns are important weapons — they are not just big M16s! They have a definite role in infantry combat. Today, though, I am afraid that we have let our proficiency with our machineguns lapse, to become almost a lost art. We don’t seem to realize how many machineguns our infantry divisions have or what an awesome amount of firepower those weapons offer to the commander. For example, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany has more than 1,300 M60 and .50 caliber machineguns in its combat battalions, and close to 600 M60 and .50 caliber machineguns in its combat support and combat service support units. The 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis has roughly 525 M60 and .50 caliber machineguns in its combat battalions with another 475 plus M60 and .50 caliber machineguns in its combat support and
combat service support units. We must train all our soldiers — combat, combat support, and combat service support to use this tremendous combat capability.
Since we can expect Threat infantry soldiers to come at us either on foot or on vehicles, we cannot afford to let this tremendous reservoir of firepower dry up from a lack of appreciation or understanding. We must regain the pride we once had in our ability to use machineguns with deadly and telling effect. We should never forget the important role the
machinegun has played in past wars, and what a devastating weapon it can be when properly employed by a well trained gun crew.
In World War I, for example, the machinegun’ s deadly fire contributed to the domination of the defense and a corresponding loss of maneuver on the battlefield. In World War II, they were used in every theatre, in every battle. The fighting for Bastogne exemplified the effectiveness of the machinegun in the defense.
On the morning of 20 December 1944, six German tanks and self-propelled guns followed by a battalion of Volks-grenadiers attacked the positions of the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry. U.S. tank destroyers engaged the leading enemy tanks, opening a gap between the tanks and the following infantry. Machineguns firing at maximum ranges on the Volksgrenadiers severely disorganized their attack, With the failure of the dismounted assault and the destruction of their close-in antiarmor protection, the enemy tanks discontinued the attack.
In the Korean War, the highly mobile and responsive machineguns often provided the firepower necessary to defend successfully against a numerically superior enemy. On 29 January 1951, Company F, 21st Infantry held a hilltop that was dominated by enemy fire from a higher hill nearby. One platoon, using its sole operational machinegun to guard the saddle between the two hilltops, directed fire against the connecting saddle and successfully beat back six heavy assaults by Chinese Communist forces against its perimeter defense. Thousands of similar small unit fights were fought and won through the effective employment of the machinegun.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the infantry machineguns enhanced the tanks’ effectiveness. The machinegun was important for beating back dismounted assault elements, relieving pressure on tanks under attack by close-in infantry carrying antitank weapons. Here at Fort Benning, we are emphasizing the use of machineguns in all of our training. At the 1st Infantry Training Brigade (OSUT), for example, the new soldiers, in addition to receiving machinegun familiarization training, also learn how to be good assistant gunners. We have plans to increase their training so that all OSUT graduates will qualify as machinegunners.
In our leadership classes, too, we have revitalized our machinegun instruction, and we are now emphasizing in those classes the basics of machinegun training, maintenance, and, most of all, employment. Units in the field can expect that the junior leaders who graduate from the various courses at the Infantry School will know how to fight their machineguns.
Our units can regain their necessary expertise in this “lost art” by:
• Ensuring that machinegun teams consist of assigned, qualified gunners and proficient assistant gunners.
• Training with machineguns under a variety of climatic conditions, night and day, and under full MOPP.
• Training with all available night surveillance equipment.
• Developing expertise in machinegun maintenance by having the crew members face up to and solve immediate action crises both during daylight and at night and while engaged in tactical situations, such as patrolling. (How many machinegunners can change a barrel when blindfolded?)
• Developing the crew members’ physical capabilities so that they can carry their weapons, accessories, and ammunition for considerable distances and cross-country. (How many platoon and squad leaders know how to get their weapons over small water barriers?)
• Training the machinegun crews to fire effectively and accurately at controlled rates of fire to destroy targets with a minimum expenditure of ammunition.
• Training the crew members to check the FPL for proper grazing fire by walking the FPL trace and, more important, insisting that all junior leaders do the same.
• Training the junior leaders to understand and appreciate the value of machinegun fires when those fires are properly integrated with other available fire as well as with mines and wire.
• Having standard drills to make sure the machinegun is placed in action quickly and effectively. (I noticed during a recent visit to Germany that German mechanized infantrymen always dismounted the machinegunners first — not a bad idea.)
• Training the machinegun crews to work closely with the ATGM teams.
• Emphasizing the habitual use of the Range Card.
It is time for us to return the machinegun to its rightful position in the minds, and hands, of our infantrymen, and we must stress its use on the modern battlefield. Our potential opponents’ current tables of organization show that they certainly have not lost their respect for this basic infantry weapon. Nor should we!
Дополняет ее в том же номере статья Weapons Squad за авторством CAPTAIN JACK H. CAGE:
The primary function of today’s mechanized infantry rifle platoon is to dismount from its vehicle and to either attack or defend using its organic weapons. Unfortunately, the most important of the platoon’s organic weapons — its five M60 machineguns, its three M47 Dragons, and its one M202A 1 multi-shot rocket launcher (Flash) — do not have assigned gunners. As a result, these weapons are almost useless to the platoon leader because too few of his soldiers know how to employ them properly. All too often, in fact, it is the lowest ranking and strongest soldiers in a platoon who become the gunners, regardless of their technical abilities.
I feel, therefore, that the mechanized infantry platoon should be reorganized and that a weapon squad, integral to the platoon, should be created (See Figure 1). The assistant platoon sergeant, who has no real duties, would become the weapon squad leader and would be responsible for:
• Training the squad members to properly use their assigned weapons and associated equipment, including the squad’s carrier.
• Tactically employing the squad’s weapons. The weapon squad would operate as one unit, or its weapons could be attached to the three rifle squads. The weapons squad carrier would have two AN/GRC-160 radios for the platoon leader’s use. When the platoon dismounted, the weapon squad leader would control his carrier. coordinate the employment of his squad, advise the platoon leader on the employment of the weapons, and, if necessary, control the platoon’s carrier element in cases where both the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant accompanied the maneuver element. For example , on a platoon battle position during a defensive operation, the weapons squad leader would:
• Advise the platoon leader on the location and use of the squad’s weapons.
• Site the weapons.
• Advise the platoon leader on the best location for the platoon carrier element.
• Position the carrier element.
• Supervise the preparation of the weapon squad’s range cards.
• Prepare a platoon direct fire plan for the platoon leader. I can already hear some of the arguments against this proposal;
• “The span of control would be too great for the weapon squad leader.' ’ One solution to this would be to add a team leader from one of the understrength rifle squads; he could lead the “Dragon team” or the “machinegun team.” Or, without additional personnel, a senior gunner could be designated for each of the two teams. The senior gunner could perform the functions normally assigned to a team leader.
• “The rifle squad leaders can adequately train the machinegunners, the Dragon gunners, and the Flash gunners.” In a full-strength,
well-trained infantry unit, the squad leaders may be able to train these gunners quite well. But many infantry units today have young, relatively inexperienced squad leaders who must concentrate on teaching and performing the basics — battle drill, maintenance, rifle marksmanship, and the like. In such a situation, machinegun and Dragon skills become low priorities. And in a general war mobilization, these barely experienced men would soon become the “old pros.” Specialization would become critical because so little time would be available for predeployment, and later, for replacement training.
• “We would lose the assistant platoon sergeant.” Actually, the platoon would gain a specific title for an experienced leader and would profit from the specific job title of weapon squad leader. Besides, the position of assistant platoon sergeant is a relatively recent one that is rarely addressed doctrinally or functionally in infantry units.
• ‘‘ Because the mechanized infantry will rarely operate dismounted, it doesn't really need extensive and skillful use of machineguns or Flash.’ Certain conditions dictate mounted infantry operations only, even though relatively little of the squad’s firepower can be employed from an Ml 13. The infantry, however, must fight the close-in battle and must be able to operate both mounted and
dismounted. If weapons such as the M60 machinegun cannot be properly employed, the infantry’s ability to fight is severely weakened. Those are the more plausible arguments against the reorganization, but there are also some distinct advantages:
• The reorganization would require the platoon to emphasize its key weapons instead of relegating them to a position behind the M16A1 rifle and the M203 grenade launcher, which are the weapons that have assigned operators.
• The weapon squad leader would be specifically detailed to train dedicated gunners in markmanship and in the tactical employment of the platoon’s key weapons.
• The weapon squad leader would be the platoon leader’s direct fire advisor to assist with range card supervision, the platoon’s fire plan, the location of the platoon carrier element, and the like.
• Gunners would be dedicated and specifically assigned to a weapon. Though the Dragon gunners and the Flash gunner would also often operate as riflemen when their respective weapons were not needed, their primary function would be the operation of their Dragons or M202s, not their rifles. There is little need to reorganize any mechanized infantry platoon whose men are proficient on all of its weapons. But those whose men are not proficient need to take steps to regain their lost skills.I believe that my proposed reorganization would place the needed emphasis on the weapons and the skills necessary for the platoon to fight, and, with a large portion of command attention added, it would enable the platoon to use its most potent weapons to their full potential.
Когда выкладывал, думал прежде всего об уважаемом dargot и его полиболофильской серии, но думаю не только ему пригодится. Переводить не буду - кому надо и так поймет, да и людей, не владеющих языком невероятного союзника хотя-бы на уровне "читаю несложный текст по теме своего интереса" уже не осталось....Гугл, опять же, в помощь (хотя там выдает местами такие перлы)....